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Abstract: The portmanteau Brexit describes the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European 
Union (EU) which will cause a shift of power in the European institutions. The departure of one of the largest 
EU members will affect the voting power of member countries in the European Council significantly. This 
Council is the central hub of political decision making in the EU, defining the overall political direction 
and priorities and setting the policy agenda for the entirety of the EU. Using the Banzhaf power index, 
we have measured the voting power before and after the Brexit and analyzed the increasing power of the 
members of the Visegrád Group compared to other European states. We have found that there is growth in 
the voting power of all Visegrád states, with Poland experiencing the biggest increase. However, the extent 
by which the Visegrád Group will profit from this statistically growing power depends on the coordination 
of their voting behavior in the future.
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Political constellations in the European Union after Brexit
On June 23, 2016 the British electorate decided in a respectable turnout of 72.2%, the United Kingdom’s 
(UK) place in Europe and the World. Hoping to regain their international power and influence by leaving 
the European Union (EU) and thus reclaim political and economic independence, 51.9% of voters chose for 
the UK to leave the EU. This to a large extent unexpected decision has troubled British society, politics, and 
the economy and has caused division between those who voted for Remain and Leave, particularly along 
regional borders. While most regions voted to leave, London, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Gibraltar1 
opposed this disintegrative objective. This referendum could, theoretically, lead to the break-up of the UK 
as a result of another Scottish independence referendum aiming on reintegrating this Northern region into 
the EU. This rather unlikely scenario and the UK’s decision to leave the EU have only added to the growing 
scepticism about Europe’s future after the real exit of the UK in presumably several years. 
Irrespective of the obvious political, economic, and social issues the EU referendum will provoke in 
the UK, as well as in Europe as a whole, we have to assume that the EU will continue to exist as the only 
framework securing European countries’ political stability, prosperity and global position despite growing 
disintegrative forces. But on the other hand there is already conflict brewing about concepts and levels of 
European integration, which will flare up, and most likely cause a change in the design of the EU.
1 Other local areas voted against Brexit, too. See The Electoral Commission, http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-
information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/upcoming-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/electorate-and-
count-information (accessed: July 28, 2016).
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The UK with the third largest population in the EU was presumed to be a crucial part of the overall 
equilibrium in Europe when market orientation, free-trade, economic liberalism, and balanced integration 
were considered in contrast to dirigisme, protectionism, deeper integration and growing EU budgets. The UK 
is one of the economically most liberal and less regulated countries with the second lowest score for state 
control (Koske et al. 2016). Together with Ireland, the Netherlands, the Nordics and some Eastern Europeans 
it is a principal agent for economic liberalization in the European Council, representing about 25% of votes 
(Irwin 2015, 14-15).  In the past, Germany as a swing voter used to balance and mediate between this liberal and 
the opposing, more regulatory and state-interventionist bloc, which includes most notably the Mediterranean 
countries and some Eastern and Western European states. In the near future, different actors or blocs in Europe 
are seen as possible beneficiaries of UK’s exit from the EU because of their hence growing political influence and 
ability to shape the future of the EU. This could possibly shift the focus away from liberal economic concepts 
towards regulatory and state-interventionist ones, at the same moment dissolving the latter and establishing 
another major player on the European scene. It is, however, more likely that the European matrix of interests 
will become even more diverse and attempt to safeguard the EU’s future on a broader basis. 
The political constellations after the financial crisis of 2008 are indicators for some new European 
alliances, overriding the hitherto existing liberal-regulatory antagonism. Following the financial crisis 
and the Greek debt crisis, which started in 2010, the traditional European microstructure of cooperation 
has been rearranged and extended. The German-French dynamics have slowed down dramatically, Spain 
and Italy have fallen even further behind and the UK has refused to play an active political role on the 
European stage. Voting records in the European Council show that between 2009 and 2015 the UK was 
on the losing side 12.3% of the time, the highest percentage for any member state. Germany and Austria, 
in joint second place, were on the losing side for only 5.4% of votes (Hix, Hagemann, and Frantescu 
2016, 4). The weakening of Germany’s traditional political partners has led to intensified relations with 
new member states, in particular Poland. Contrary to Southern European member states, most Eastern 
European member states were in line with German austerity policy, emphasizing budgetary discipline and 
cost-saving reforms just as they had implemented in the transition period. But, this emerging alliance 
was fragile from the beginning and has been affected by the political course of the PiS government in 
Poland and later by Germany’s attitude and claims during the refugee crisis of 2015/16. Eastern European 
politicians perceived Germany’s demands as invasive and inadequate and the overall situation seemed to 
weaken the basis for cooperation between Germany and Eastern Europe.
Nevertheless, these incidences brought the Eastern European states closer again, revitalizing the 
Visegrád Group (V4) especially, which was established in 1991 as a core of cooperation and coordination 
vis-à-vis Western Europe, but mainly Russia. This formalized cooperation between the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia was weakened following the enlargement of the EU and especially by 
different attitudes and politics towards Russia when the Ukraine crisis broke out in 2014. The voting 
behavior of these countries in the European Council did not suggest the building of a coalition since 
variance was very high (Hix, Hagemann, and Frantescu 2016), but the refugee crisis one year later helped 
to overcome dissent and cooperation intensified once again. This could have an impact on voting behavior 
in the Council. Post-Brexit the Visegrád countries will lose “an invaluable ally […] because it shared a 
‘common perception of European problems’, as Poland’s foreign minister, Witold Waszczykowski, put it” 
(Connolly 2016). A joint contribution by the foreign ministers of France and Germany four days after the 
British referendum confirmed the Visegrád countries’ concerns about Europe’s future development. Both 
Western politicians announced a “move further towards political union in Europe” and they emphasized 
that there is a “need to recognise that member states differ in their levels of ambition […] when it comes 
to the project of European integration” (Ayrault and Steinmeier 2016). Irrespective of ruling parties’ 
ideological affiliation, Visegrád countries reject a deeper integration, a two-speed and more regulatory 
Europe and mandatory quotas for refugees, and following Brexit they will lose their leading EU partner in 
these critical policy areas. In addition, among the Visegrád countries only Slovakia is part of the Eurozone 
and “Brexit is likely to enhance the power of the eurozone within the EU” (Oliver 2016, 4). There seems to 
be at least a Visegrád Group or even an Eastern European idea on Europe’s future design and politics that 
could influence these countries in building of coalitions and voting in the European Council.
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Therefore, it is worth analyzing possible post-Brexit constellations in the European Council on the 
basis of the changing distribution of power, indicating the emergence of the most probable winning or 
blocking coalitions. There are different alternatives to measure power, but we have used the (normalized) 
Banzhaf power index, measuring “the relative ability of each member to affect the outcome of the group’s 
decisions through his vote” (Banzhaf 1966, 1315). This index is used widely to measure voting power, not 
only in the European Council. 
Changes in voting power in the European Council
The European Council makes decisions using simple majority, qualified majority and unanimous vote, but 
the most issues are decided by qualified majority voting (QMV). In voting bodies like the European Council 
votes have different voting powers, because of their differing “ability to affect outcomes by participating in 
the voting process” (Banzhaf 1966, 1315). QMV in the European Council has always been based on weighted 
votes and certain quotas. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty the triple majority rule implemented by the Treaty of 
Nice was used (Felsenthal and Machover 2001; Leech 2001). However, this did not take into account the 
size of a member state’s population and therefore the same voting power was assigned to the four largest 
EU members Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy and a majority threshold of 260 votes out of total 
352 with an optional condition of 62% of the total EU population was used. Table 1 shows the populations 
and voting powers according to the existing decision rules under the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 
December 2007, implementing a simplified double majority system and prescribing that as of 1 November 
2014 “a qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55% of the members of the Council representing 
the participating Member States, comprising at least 65% of the population of these States. A blocking 
minority must include at least four Council members, failing which the qualified majority shall be deemed 
attained” (2007, 18). In addition, another threshold of 72% for special decisions as well as a transitional 
period from 1 November 2014 to 31 March 2017 has been introduced. As a consequence, the four largest 
EU member states, especially Germany, have gained significantly more voting power at the expense of 
medium sized states (Göllner 2016). Thus, decisions depend “explicitly on the size of population of the 
member-states” and “will be automatically affected by demographic changes” (Felsenthal and Machover 
2009, 318-319). Changes in the size of the EU, due to enlargements or exits by member states, do not require 
the assignment of new voting weights, but will affect voting power through change in population ratios.
As the UK is leaving the EU, voting power of the other members is automatically changing due to rising 
population ratio. We would therefore expect an increase in voting power for all remaining members, but 
indeed the larger countries such as Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Poland expand their voting power 
above the average at the expense of the smaller countries. In fact, the biggest winner in voting power post-
Brexit is Poland, gaining 27.8% in relative terms, followed by Spain gaining 23.0%. The Czech Republic 
gains 4.0%, Hungary 3.6% and Slovakia 0.7% voting power. In total, Brexit will increase the voting power 
of Visegrád Group by 36.1%. Member states with less than roughly 4.4 Million citizens will lose power, with 
the turning-point currently deviating between Ireland and Croatia. Table 2 illustrates these changes in 
voting power for the post-Brexit EU. This can be explained by the diminishing pivotal function of smaller 
states following Brexit, thus reducing the significance of supporting countries to the advantage of the 
population factor. Furthermore, while in the EU 28 there were 30,401,043 winning coalitions, this will drop 
to 17,700,989 after Brexit, increasing the probability of reaching a decision from 11.3% to 13.2% (König and 
Bräuninger 2000), also adding to the influence the Visegrád Group could exert.
Another critical point is the high number of migrants from Visegrád countries working in the UK. 
According to Eurostat2, there were 869,061 Poles, 86,519 Hungarians and 80,771 Slovaks registered in the 
UK in 2015. Anti-Eastern European and especially anti-Polish sentiments increased dramatically after 
2 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-migration-projections/population-data/database, (Code migr_
pop1ctz) (accessed July 28, 2016).
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the Brexit referendum, which was in part a referendum against migration. Assuming the very unlikely 
case that all migrants from Eastern Europe will be expelled and return home, the rising population of 
Visegrád countries has virtually no effect on these countries’ voting power. Poland’s voting power would 
rise to 6.5998% (+0.1104%), although the number of Polish migrants approximately equals the population 
of Cyprus. Hungary’s power would rise to 2.8553% (+0.0049%) and Slovakia’s to 2.3294% (+0.0063%). 
However, since voting power strongly depend on member states’ population size, it’s worth looking into 
anticipated changes for the Visegrád countries. Kóczy (2016) has calculated the Shapley-Shubik power 
index until 2080 on the basis of Eurostat population projections. As a result the predicted decline in 
population of Poland, Slovakia and Hungary as opposed to the predicted population growth in the Czech 
Republic over the next 60 years will have a significant impact on the Visegrád countries’ voting power. He 
predicts a remarkable decline of voting power for the three countries due to population decrease. 
Table 1: Population,3 weighted votes and Banzhaf power index4 – Treaty of Lisbon. 
Population Population in % Weighted votes Banzhaf-power index  
(triple majority system) in %
Germany 82,162,000 16.1 29 7.7828
France 66,661,621 13.1 29 7.7828
United Kingdom 65,341,183 12.8 29 7.7827
Italy 60,665,551 11.9 29 7.7827
Spain 46,438,422 9.1 27 7.4199
Poland 37,967,209 7.4 27 7.4198
Romania 19,759,968 3.9 14 4.2591
Netherlands 16,979,120 3.3 13 3.9740
Belgium 11,289,853 2.2 12 3.6843
Greece 10,793,526 2.1 12 3.6843
Czech Republic 10,553,843 2.1 12 3.6843
Portugal 10,341,330 2.0 12 3.6843
Hungary 9,830,485 1.9 12 3.6843
Sweden 9,851,017 1.9 10 3.0924
Austria 8,700,471 1.7 10 3.0924
Bulgaria 7,153,784 1.4 10 3.0924
Denmark 5,707,251 1.1 7 2.1809
Finland 5,487,308 1.1 7 2.1809
Slovakia 5,426,252 1.1 7 2.1809
Ireland 4,658,530 0.9 7 2.1809
Croatia 4,190,669 0.8 7 2.1809
Lithuania 2,888,558 0.6 7 2.1809
Slovenia 2,064,188 0.4 4 1.2502
Latvia 1,968,957 0.4 4 1.2502
Estonia 1,315,944 0.3 4 1.2502
Cyprus 848,319 0.2 4 1.2502
3  Data on population in the EU according Eurostat, F2: Population, Forecast population on January 1, 2016. http://ec.europa.
eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-migration-projections/population-data/main-tables, Code: tps0001 (accessed 
July 26, 2016).
4  The Banzhaf power index was calculated with the open access program “Indices of Power IOP 2.0” by Thomas Bräuninger 
and Thomas König, http://www.tbraeuninger.de/download/ (accessed July 26, 2016).
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Population Population in % Weighted votes Banzhaf-power index  
(triple majority system) in %
Luxembourg 576,249 0.1 4 1.2502
Malta 434,403 0.1 3 0.9422
EU 28 510,056,011 100 352 100
EU 27 444,714,828
Summary and conclusions
The Central Eastern European Countries dispose of the Visegrád Group as a potentially powerful actor on 
the European scene. Until now, they didn’t make use of it in their voting behavior, thus missing chances to 
express common interests with one voice in the European Council. In contrast, a Mediterranean bloc, made 
up by France, Spain, and Italy and complemented by Romania (Hix, Hagemann, and Frantescu 2016), is 
already enforcing shared interests and will gain plenty of voting power after Brexit (+64.6%). If the Visegrád 
Group could align their interests and strategically coordinate their voting behavior in the Council (Napel 
and Wildgrén 2011), they could become a pivotal player on the European scene. The Visegrád cooperation 
is an existing institution but an insufficiently utilized framework for the coordination of policies and voting 
behaviors. However, a rise in voting power could negate some of the disadvantages caused by Brexit if this 
power is translated into decision making and the formation of coalitions. 
Table 2: Voting powers in the European Council before and after Brexit.
EU 28 before Brexit EU 27 after Brexit
   Population 
  in %
  Banzhaf-power index  





   Changes of      
   voting power  
   in %
Relative changes 
of voting power 
in %
Germany 16.1 10.2760 18.5 12.0099 +1.7339 +16.9
France 13.1 8.4444 15.0 9.9769 +1.5325 +18.1
United Kingdom 12.8 8.2953
Italy 11.9 7.8046 13.6 9.1136 +1.309 +16.8
Spain 9.1 6.1914 10.4 7.6161 +1.4247 +23.0
Poland 7.4 5.0770 8.5 6.4894 +1.4124 +27.8
Romania 3.9 3.7577 4.4 4.0094 +0.2517 +6.7
Netherlands 3.3 3.4709 3.8 3.6917 +0.2208 +6.4
Belgium 2.2 2.8969 2.5 3.0241 +0.1272 +4.4
Greece 2.1 2.8471 2.4 2.9650 +0.1179 +4.1
Czech Republic 2.1 2.8229 2.4 2.9366 +0.1137 +4.0
Portugal 2.0 2.8015 2.3 2.9113 +0.1098 +3.9
Sweden 1.9 2.7522 2.2 2.8529 +0.1007 +3.7
Hungary 1.9 2.7502 2.2 2.8504 +0.1002 +3.6
Austria 1.7 2.6366 1.9 2.7154 +0.0788 +3.0
Bulgaria 1.4 2.4811 1.6 2.5303 +0.0492 +2.0
Denmark 1.1 2.3353 1.3 2.3569 +0.0216 +0.9
Finland 1.1 2.3131 1.2 2.3305 +0.0174 +0.7
Slovakia 1.1 2.3069 1.2 2.3231 +0.0162 +0.7
ContinuedTable 1: Population,3 weighted votes and Banzhaf power index4 – Treaty of Lisbon. 
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EU 28 before Brexit EU 27 after Brexit
   Population 
  in %
  Banzhaf-power index  





   Changes of      
   voting power  
   in %
Relative changes 
of voting power 
in %
Ireland 0.9 2.2294 1.0 2.2308 +0.0014 +0.1
Croatia 0.8 2.1822 0.9 2.1744 -0.0078 -0.4
Lithuania 0.6 2.0508 0.7 2.0172 -0.0336 -1.6
Slovenia 0.4 1.9671 0.5 1.9169 -0.0502 -2.5
Latvia 0.4 1.9575 0.4 1.9055 -0.052 -2.7
Estonia 0.3 1.8910 0.3 1.8264 -0.0646 -3.4
Cyprus 0.2 1.8436 0.2 1.7696 -0.074 -4.0
Luxembourg 0.1 1.8159 0.1 1.7365 -0.0794 -4.4
Malta 0.1 1.8014 0.1 1.7192 -0.0822 -4.6
EU 27 87.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 +8.2953 100.0
Visegrád Group 12.5 12.959 14.3 14.5995 +1.6425 +36.1
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